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Abstract: Prior literature on a two-level supply chain has mainly focused on the game between one
manufacturer and one supplier. Exploring group game behavior in a green supply chain (GSC),
our research develops and studies a sequential GSC game model consisting of a single manufacturer
and three suppliers based on the characteristics of the textile and apparel industry clusters. In our GSC
model, the manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain and the suppliers are either homogeneous
or complementary. Through equilibrium analysis, we identify critical conditions that influence the
behavior of the manufacturer and suppliers to improve the green investment in the supply chain.
Our study provides a theoretical basis and a decision-making reference for promoting the cooperation
in GSCs and improving the performance of the government’s environmental policies.
Keywords: equilibrium analysis; game; green supply chain; group game behavior; textile and
apparel industry
1. Introduction
Having the world’s largest producer, consumer, and exporter of the textile and apparel industry,
China takes more than 50% of the world’s total fiber processing and 40% of global textile and apparel
exports (Statistical data of China Textile Economic Research Center in 2016). In recent years, China
has raised great awareness of ecological environment protection. Since 2015, China has implemented
the new Environmental Protection Law to encourage enterprises to practice green supply chains (GSC).
Furthermore, the law aims to enhance supervision responsibility of governments, which poses
enormous challenges to the textile industry in China.
In Zhejiang Province, for example, the total annual output of the textile and apparel industry
accounts for 16.62% of the province’s total industrial output. The number of textile and apparel
enterprises is 58,178, of which 97.56% are small and medium-sized enterprises (2016 Zhejiang
Statistical Yearbook). In recent years, efforts in environmental protection have increased year
by year. From the official data released by Zhejiang Environmental Protection Bureau, in 2017,
more than 1000 environmental cases of this industry were investigated and penalized in Zhejiang.
Large-scale and long-term suspension of production has seriously suppressed industrial development.
Therefore, how to establish a sustainable development mode of inter-firm cooperation has become
a topic of great concern to the industry and the government.
Green supply chain management (GSCM) is an effective way to improve the performance of
industrial environment [1]. Incorporating sustainability into the supply chain is becoming a key priority
for many textile and apparel companies. For example, H&M, Patagonia, and The North Face have
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incorporated various approaches to enhance their levels of sustainable supply chain management [2].
The prior studies have demonstrated that specific modes of collaboration can both enable effective
GSCM and diminish barriers for policy implementation [3,4].
The textile and apparel industry in China is geographically clustered [5]. Based on the views of
“2016 China Textile Industry Cluster Development Report” by China National Textile and Apparel
Council (CNTAC), industry information inside the cluster is almost completely transparent, and there
exists complex game behavior among supply chain partners that maintain complementary, competitive,
or cooperative relationships with each other. Brands that occupy a central position are the leaders of
the supply chain. The upstream and downstream SMEs act according to the leader’s requirements.
Our investigation on the textile and apparel industry in Zhejiang also proved the above judgement.
Therefore, it is of great practical significance to analyze the game behavior between suppliers and
manufacturers in the GSC and explore the GSC governance mechanism, based on the reality of the
textile and apparel industry in China.
The prior literature on a two-level supply chain has focused on the game between one manufacturer
and one supplier. Research on group game behavior in GSC needs to be improved. For instance, the game
between the manufacturer and the supplier group, and the game between the homogenous or complementary
suppliers. Based on the characteristics of the textile and apparel industry clusters, this study develops a
novel two-level GSC game model consisting of a single manufacturer and three suppliers and identifies
some critical conditions for implementing green improvement in the GSC through equilibrium analysis.
In particular, our model assumes that the manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain, and the suppliers
are either homogeneous or complementary. Through game analysis, we derive the game equilibrium price
and corresponding equilibrium conditions of the GSC. Our game model and findings make significant
contributions to the literature by providing the strategic guidance for all parties to participate in the greening
process and especially for GSC leader to make managerial decision to promote greening.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews prior related literature.
Section 3 presents a two-level GSC game model consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple
suppliers. In Section 4, through the model optimization analysis, we demonstrate the equilibrium
conditions within the GSC and discuss their implications. The last section concludes the paper with
practical recommendations.
2. Prior Literature
This section first reviews prior literature by focusing on the following two research streams:
Textile and apparel GSCM and game between stakeholders in GSCs, and then highlight the differences
of our research from prior studies.
2.1. Textile and Apparel Green Supply Chain Management
In 1996, the Institute of Manufacturing Research at Michigan State University proposed the
concept of GSCM. Through a systematic literature review/bibliometric analysis of GSCM articles
published from 2006 to 2016, De Oliveira et al. [6] analyzed the subject’s and identified that the
textile/manufacturing, automotive and electronic sectors were the most discussed.
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are available to explore GSCM policies. Stefan [7]
reviewed more than 300 representative papers related to green or sustainable supply chains, of which
about 50 applied quantitative models, including life cycle assessment, equilibrium analysis models,
multi-objective decision making, and analytic hierarchy processes [8–10]. An early GSCM case study
was also conducted from the perspective of qualitative analysis [11]. In addition, scenario planning
model is a popular qualitative model in GSCM research, for instance, Chen et al. [12] proposed
a two-tier scenario planning model, consisting of scenario development and policy portfolio planning,
to demonstrate the environmental sustainability policy planning process.
In the area of textile and apparel sustainable supply chain management, Shen et al. [2]
introduced the fifteen articles published and found that typical approaches include sustainable product
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strategy, sustainable investment, sustainable performance evaluation, corporate social responsibility,
and environmental management system adoption [4,13–16].
2.2. Game Between Stakeholders in Green Supply Chain
The main reason for the environmental pollution is the conflict between the maximization of
the company’s own interests and the overall interests of society. Game theory provides a theoretical
solution to the problem of environmental pollution. From the late 1980s, game theory has been widely
used to solve various conflict relationships in environmental problems. GSCM is a complex process
that involves many internal and external stakeholders, suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers,
central government, local governments, consumers [17,18]. Different players have different interests
and different attitudes towards SC greening, which leads to the game between GSC stakeholders.
The green measures adopted by enterprises are the game results of all stakeholders. Using game
theory to study GSCM problems, there are large amounts of literature [19–34], which have been mainly
conducted from the following three perspectives.
The first is the game analysis of internal stakeholders in the GSC. For instance, Ji et al. [19] used
evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic cooperative game relations between the manufacturer
and the supplier in the GSC and obtained the critical conditions of adopting the ecological strategy
simultaneously. Ghosh and Shah [20] built game theoretic models and show how greening levels,
prices and profits are influenced by channel structures, and used a two-part contract to coordinate the
GSC. Liu [21] established a GSC game model between a single manufacturer and a single supplier,
taking a government subsidy and outside option into consideration. In addition, it discussed what the
supplier should do when the leading manufacturer implements internalization of the environmental
cost. Liu [22] constructed a supply chain pricing strategy game model based on the internalization of
environmental costs and used the net present value (NPV) model to generate a reasonable value of
government subsidies. Jiang and Sui [23] built a game model consisting of a single manufacturer and
a single retailer under the revenue sharing contract and explored the optimal range of revenue sharing
coefficients. Raj et al. [24] proposed a generalized analytical model for GSC and obtained a new type
of hybrid contract RGCS (revenue and greening-cost sharing contracts).
The second is the game analysis of GSC and external stakeholders. Typically, Zhu and Dou [25]
formulated a game theoretic model to study the costs and benefits of core enterprises in the GSC
under different environmental strategies. Jin et al. [26] constructed a game model with green products
as variables in the context of two government incentive strategies: Subsidies based on recycling
percentage or recycling amount. The best strategies for enterprises and the optimal incentives for
governments in equilibrium situations were obtained.
The third is the game analysis of multi-stakeholders. For instance, Hu [27] built a two-level
non-cooperative GSC game model, considering government and consumer supervision, to clarify the
transmission mechanism of the environmental investment process in GSC. An et al. [28] established
a game revenue function and strategy analysis model to explain the game strategy relationships from
three levels, which are local government and enterprises, local government and central government,
and enterprises and consumers. Liu et al. [29] selected the central government, local government and
supply chain enterprises to establish a dynamic game model and explored the mechanism of supply
chain environmental costs internalization. They further found the game equilibrium strategy and the
interaction relationships between various stakeholders. Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [30] developed
a competitive mathematical model of government as the leader and two competitive green and
non-green supply chains as the followers, pricing policies, greening strategies and governance tariffs
determining in supply chains competition under government financial intervals were discussed.
In summary, the previous research on GSCM has covered the connotation, driving and obstacle
factors, the game relationship optimization among various stakeholders, and policy recommendations.
Most of the existing literature has mainly analyzed the game relationship based on the supply
chain structure of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. However, the Chinese textile
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and apparel industry presents a regional clustered distribution, which means there are complex
game relationships between core manufacturers and multiple suppliers, between each other of the
homogeneous or complementary suppliers. Our targeted GSC mechanism research towards this
scenario, therefore, has special theoretical and practical value. Specifically, our study makes the
following main contributions to the existing literature: (1) We develop a one-to-three sequential game
model by incorporating the characteristics of homogeneous and complementary suppliers; (2) we
investigate the group game behavior in GSC of textile and apparel industry with our analytical model;
(3) we derive the equilibrium under three different scenarios, which quantify and define the scope of
regulation acceptable to all parties, helping to develop the best GSC strategies.
3. Model of Green Supply Chain
This section presents a two-level GSC game model consisting of a single manufacturer and
multiple suppliers. We first describe the model setting and sequence, and then show the basic game
model along with the manufacturer and suppliers’ decision before and after green investment.
3.1. Model Setting
The supply chain of the textile and apparel industry mainly includes raw material suppliers
(providing cotton, silk and wool), suppliers of primary products (providing clothing fabric), manufacturer
of garments, and retailers. This process is accompanied by a variety of ancillary support links, including
auxiliary material suppliers, manufacturing equipment suppliers, and so on. According to the industry,
this study abstracts a two-level GSC structure consisting of one manufacturer and three suppliers
(two homogeneous suppliers and one complementary supplier). We develop a manufacturer-led game
model to explore its multi-party game relationship, and to obtain the equilibrium prices when benefits
are maximized. The research assumptions are as follows:
(1) Both the manufacturer and suppliers are risk-neutral, and the goal of their decisions is to
maximize profits. Assume that the manufacturer M only involves the operation of two raw materials,
the main material m1 and the auxiliary material m2. The supplier S1 and the supplier S2. are
homogenous suppliers, providing the raw material m1. The supplier S3, as a complementary supplier
of the supplier S1. and the supplier S2, provide the raw material m2. The manufacturer M. and the
supplier S1 have established a stable cooperative relationship in long-term procurement. The auxiliary
material supplier S3 passively adopts the same decision-making options as the main material suppliers.
Relationships between the model’s main players are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Relationships b the model’s main players.
(2) Referring to Jiang and Sui [23] and Zhu and Dou [25], the demand Q is positively c rrelate with
the total market demand a and the product’s greening level g, and negatively correlated with the unit price
P of the product. The demand function is represented as Q(P, g) = a− bP+ kg. Consumers who prefer
“cheap and good quality” products tend to buy green products at a low price. b is the price sensitivity
coefficient and k. is the coefficient representing the sensitivity of a consumer to a product’s greening level,
where a, b, k > 0. Referring to Zhu and Dou [31], it is assumed that the price of ordinary products before
greening is PM, and its greening level is g0. g0 is the lowest greening level of the admission to the market.
The pric of product after greening is PME, and its gr ening lev l is g. Obviously, g > g0 > 0, i.e., the higher
the greening level of the product, the more environmentally friendly. In the t xtile and apparel industry,
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the greening level of the product can usually be measured by the solvent toxicity and recyclability in the
production process, the carbon label and the degree of natural degradation of the discarded clothes.
(3) This study focuses on the analysis of game relationships within GSC, and subsequent research
can be extended to the analysis of game relationships with external stakeholders. Therefore, we assume
that external stakeholders have reached a game equilibrium, that is, consumers are willing to purchase
green products produced by manufacturers, and the government will supervise manufacturers to
implement green investment. Manufacturers are motivated to develop green products, the costs of
which includes production process improving, procurement of related equipment, and R&D of new
products. Referring to D’Asprement’s approach [32], the product R&D cost formula is Z = zg2, where z
is the R&D adjustment factor and z > 0. Supplier S1 and S2 are free to decide whether to respond to
the manufacturer’s green investment. R&D costs are all borne by the manufacturer, and suppliers only
bear additional green processing costs.
3.2. Modelling Thoughts
With reference to Ding and Shen [33] and Wang [34], in the early stage of enterprise investment in
green product research, subsidies and supervision given by local governments are the main driving
force. Consumers’ acceptance of green products motivates further R&D investment.
In this study, according to the current environmental policy of the textile and apparel industry
in China, we assume that local governments adopt supervision and punishment policy first on the
manufacturer. After taking the lead in implementing the green investment, the manufacturer puts
forward higher environmental requirements to its upstream suppliers. The supplier S1, the long-term
partner of the manufacturer M, faces the game choice of whether to implement green investment. If the
supplier S1 chooses to invest, its partnership with the manufacturer M continues. The complementary
supplier S3 of the supplier S1 passively participates in green investment.
If the supplier S1 chooses not to respond to the manufacturer M, the manufacturer M seeks a new
supplier S2. At this point, the supplier S2 faces the game choice of whether to implement the green investment.
If the supplier S2 chooses to invest, they reach a partnership. The manufacturer M needs to pay extra purchase
costs. The complementary supplier S3 of the supplier S2 passively participates in green investment.
If the supplier S2 chooses not to respond, the manufacturer M returns to the original supplier S1.
Here, the supplier S1 keeps the same cost structure as before greening, but the manufacturer M needs
to pay additional raw material processing costs. The complementary supplier S3 of the supplier S1
passively participates in green investment.
The game relationships and process are shown in Figure 2.
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3.3. Decisions Before and After Green Investment
(1) Before the implementation of the green investment, the unit price of the main material m1
provided by the supplier S1 and S2 is PS, and there is a linear relationship of QS = c − dPS + kg
between the price and the sales volume. Here, c is the total demand of m1 and d is the price sensitivity
coefficient, where c, d > 0. The unit price of the auxiliary material m2 provided by the supplier S3 is
PY, and there is a linear relationship of QY = e − f PY + kg between the price and the sales volume,
in which e is the total demand of m2, f is the price sensitivity coefficient, and e, f > 0. The processing
cost of the manufacturer’s unit product is CM. The unit price of the manufacturer’s product is PM,
and there is a linear relationship of QM = a − bPM + kg between the price and the sales volume.
Each unit of the product needs i units of main material m1 and ix units of auxiliary material m2, that is,
QM = iQS = ixQY and i, x > 0.
(2) After the implementation of green investment, the unit price of the manufacturer’s product is
PME. Since the products are improved only in the greening level, the relationship between the price
and sales volume still satisfies QME = a − bPME + kg. The unit price of the main material m1 provided
by the supplier S1 and S2 is PSE, and there is a linear relationship of QSE = c − dPSE + kg between the
price and the sales volume. The unit price of the auxiliary material m2 provided by the supplier S3 is
PYE, and there is a linear relationship of QYE = e − f PYE + kg between the price and the sales volume.
The processing cost of the manufacturer’s unit product is CME. Each unit of the product still needs i
units of m1 and ix units of m2, that is, QME = iQSE = ixQYE. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that
the operating costs, except the processing costs of the suppliers and manufacturers, do not change
after the implementation of the green investment.
(3) After the manufacturer M implements the green investment, if the original supplier S1 does
not cooperate, the manufacturer M will purchase from the supplier S2. The purchase price is still
PSE, but the manufacturer M has to bear an additional purchase cost CC. Meantime, the supplier S1
needs to sell the raw materials to other manufacturers, and each unit of material generates additional
sales expenses CX. If the supplier S2 does not cooperate, the manufacturer M returns to purchase raw
materials from the original supplier S1. The purchase price is PS, but the manufacturer M needs to pay
an additional processing fee CD per unit product.
(4) After the manufacturer M1 implements the green investment, if the original supplier S1 and
the substitute supplier S2 do not respond to the investment, and the manufacturer M1 still purchases
the raw materials from the original supplier S1, the purchase price per unit is still PS, but it will incur
additional processing costs CD per product for manufacturer M1.
(5) After the manufacturer M implements the green investment, the probability that the supplier
S1 cooperates is α, where 0 < α < 1. After the manufacturer M implements the green investment,
the probability that the supplier S2 cooperates is β, where 0 < β < 1.
The main decision variables before and after green investment are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Decision variables before and after green investment.
Decision Variables Before Green Investment After Green Investment
Unit price of the main material m1 PS PSE
Unit cost of the main material m1 CS CSE
Unit price of the auxiliary material m2 PY PYE
Unit cost of the auxiliary material m2 CY CYE
Unit price of the product PM PME
Unit processing cost of the product CM CME
Unit processing cost of the main material m1 CA CAE
Unit processing cost of the auxiliary material m2 CB CBE
Supply chain green R&D costs – ZM
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3.4. Basic Game Model
In the game between the manufacturer M and its suppliers S1,S2,S3, the decision-making behavior
of the participants has a sequence and all participants can obtain the historical information of the game,
then making their own decisions optimal. Therefore, the manufacturer-led one-to-many sequential
game is a complete information dynamic game system. With the deepening of the supply chain
greening, the game is played repeatedly. As the game evolves, the system will continue to optimize and
improve until the Pareto optimality is achieved. The manufacturer M takes the lead in implementing a
green investment, and the supplier S1 chooses to cooperate. The profit R1 of the manufacturer is the
revenue of the product minus the processing cost of the product, the purchase cost of the material m1
and m2, and the R&D cost ZM. The profit R2 of the supplier S1, is the revenue of main material m1
minus the raw material cost and the raw material processing cost. The profit R3 of the supplier S3,
is the revenue of auxiliary material m2 minus the raw material cost and raw material processing cost.
At this point, the profit R4 of the supplier S2, in the original supply chain, is the revenue of the material
m1 minus the raw material cost, and the raw material processing cost. The functions are as follows:
R1 = QME(PME − CME) − QSEPSE − QYEPYE − ZM, (1)
R2 = QSE(PSE − CSE − CAE), (2)
R3 = QYE(PYE − CYE − CBE), (3)
R4 = QS(PS − CS − CA). (4)
The manufacturer M takes the lead in implementing a green investment. If the supplier S1 chooses
not to cooperate, the manufacturer M achieves cooperation with the supplier S2. Then, the profit
R5 of the manufacturer M, is the revenue of the products minus the processing cost of the product,
the additional procurement cost, the procurement cost of the materials m1 and m2, and the R&D cost
ZM. The profit R6 of the supplier S2 is the revenue of the main material m1 minus the raw material
cost and raw material processing cost. The profit R7 of the supplier S3, is the revenue of the auxiliary
material m2 minus the raw material cost and raw material processing cost. At this point, the profit
R8 of the supplier S1, is the revenue of the material m1 minus the raw material cost, the raw material
processing cost and the additional sales cost. The functions are as follows:
R5 = QME(PME − CME − CC) − QSEPSE − QYEPYE − ZM, (5)
R6 = QSE(PSE − CSE − CAE), (6)
R7 = QYE(PYE − CYE − CBE), (7)
R8 = QS(PS − CS − CA − CX). (8)
The manufacturer M takes the lead in implementing a green investment and fails to reach
cooperation with the supplier S2 after refused by the supplier S1. Then the manufacturer M returns
to cooperate with the original supplier S1. Thus, the profit R9 of the manufacturer M is the revenue
of the product minus the product processing cost, the procurement cost of the materials m1 and m2,
the additional processing cost and the R&D cost ZM. The profit R10 of the supplier S1 is the revenue of
the main material m1 minus the raw material cost and raw material processing cost. The profit R11
of the supplier S3, is the revenue of the auxiliary material m2 minus the raw material cost and raw
material processing cost. At this point, the profit R12 of the supplier S2 is the revenue of the main
material m1 minus the raw material cost and the raw material processing cost before green investment.
The functions are as follows:
R9 = QME(PME − CME − CD) − QSEPS − QYEPY − ZM, (9)
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R10 = QSE(PS − CS − CA), (10)
R11 = QYE(PY − CY − CB), (11)
R12 = QS(PS − CS − CA). (12)
4. Analysis and Discussion
We next show the conditions that influence the equilibriums that can be reached and discuss
their implications.
4.1. Game Equilibrium When the Manufacturer Takes the Lead in Bidding
Proposition 1. In the game of complete information, if the manufacturer M takes the lead in bidding,
an equilibrium purchase price P∗SE exists, which maximizes the expected profits of the manufacturer M.
The achievement of equilibrium state depends on the benefits conditions of the players at this price.
Proof. The expected profit of manufacturer M is,
piM = αR1 + (1 − α)[βR5 + (1 − β)R9]. (13)
Formula (13) is substituted by Formulas (1), (5), and (9), that is,
piM = QME[PME − CME − (β− αβ)CC − (1 − α)(1 − β)CD]
−QSE[(α+ β− αβ)PSE + (1 − α)(1 − β)PS]
−QYE[(α+ β− αβ)PYE + (1 − α)(1 − β)PY] − ZM.
(14)
To simplify the formula, Let X = PME − CME − (β− αβ)CC − (1 − α)(1 − β)CD, Y =
(α+ β− αβ)PYE + (1 − α)(1 − β)PY.
Formula (14) is substituted by QME = a − bPME + kg, QSE = c − dPSE + kg, QYE =
e − f PYE + kg, ZM = zg2, QME = iQSE = ixQYE, that is, piM = i(c − dPSE + kg)X −
(c − dPSE + kg)[(α+ β− αβ)PSE + (1 − α)(1 − β)PS] − 1x (c − dPSE + kg)Y − zg2.
The first derivative is taken with respect to PSE, that is,
∂piM
∂PSE
= −idX + dY
x
− (c+ kg)(α+ β− αβ) + 2d(α+ β− αβ)PSE + d(1 − α)(1 − β)PS.
We let the first derivative be zero, hence, when the manufacturer M maximizes the profits,
the optimal price of m1 is,
P∗SE =
c+ kg
2d
+
ixX − Y − x(1 − α)(1 − β)PS
2x(α+ β− αβ) .
The manufacturer M has the maximum expected profits, when the purchase price of the main
material m1 is P∗SE. 
Proposition 1 shows that in the manufacturer-led supply chain, the manufacturer M has the right
to bid first. The rational manufacturer tends to choose the price P∗SE where its expected profits are
maximum. In the next orderly game, the supplier S1 needs to choose whether to accept the price
by comparing the benefits in different situations. If R2 > R8, the rational supplier S1 will choose to
accept the price and implement the green investment. The supply chain reaches equilibrium here.
If not, the supplier S1 will refuse to cooperate. Then, the manufacturer M bids P∗SE to the supplier
S2. Then the supplier S2 needs to choose whether to accept the price. The supplier S2 compares the
benefits in different situations. If R6 is greater than R12 obtained by its original cooperation with other
manufacturers, the supplier S2 will choose to accept the price and implement the green investment.
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The supply chain reaches equilibrium here. If not, the supplier S2 will refuse to cooperate, and the
manufacturer returns to cooperate with the original supplier S1 at the price of P∗SE. The supply chain
regains equilibrium. Therefore, in the game in which the manufacturer takes the lead in bidding,
the equilibrium price of the green investment cooperation reached the price of P∗SE. Nevertheless,
which point to reach depends on the benefits conditions of the players at this price.
4.2. Game Equilibrium When the Supplier Takes the Lead in Bidding
Proposition 2. In the game of complete information, if the supplier takes the lead in bidding, equilibrium prices
P∗∗SE and P
∗∗∗
SE exist, which maximizes the expected profits of the supplier S1 and S2 respectively.
Proof. (1) The expected profit of supplier S1 is,
piS1 = αR2 + (1 − α)[βR8 + (1 − β)R10]. (15)
Formula (15) is substituted by Formulas (2), (8), and (10), that is,
piS1 = QSE[α(PSE − CSE − CAE) + (1 − α)(1 − β)(PS − CS − CA)] + (1 − α)βQS(PS − CS − CA − CX).
(16)
Formula (16) is substituted by QSE = c − dPSE + kg, and the first derivative is taken with respect
to PSE, that is,
∂piS1
∂PSE
= −d(1 − α)(1 − β)(PS − CS − CA) − dα(2PSE − CSE − CAE) + α(c+ kg).
We let the first derivative be zero, hence, when the supplier S1 maximizes the profits, the optimal
price of m1 is,
P∗∗SE =
c+ kg
2d
+
CSE + CAE
2
− (1 − α)(1 − β)(PS − CS − CA)
2α
.
It shows that the supplier S1 has the maximum expected profits after the green investment, when
the purchase price of the main material m1 is P∗∗SE.
(2) The expected profit of the supplier S2 is,
piS2 = αR4 + (1 − α)[βR6 + (1 − β)R12]. (17)
Formula (17) is substituted by Formulas (4), (6), and (12), that is,
piS2 = αQS(PS − CS − CA) +QSE(1 − α)β(PSE − CSE − CAE) + (1 − α)(1 − β)QS(PS − CS − CA). (18)
Formula (18) is substituted by QSE = c − dPSE + kg, and the first derivative is taken with respect
to PSE, that is,
∂piS2
∂PSE
= (1 − α)β[d(CSE + CAE − 2PSE) + kg+ c].
We let the first derivative be zero, hence, when the supplier S2 maximizes the profits, the optimal
price of m1 is,
P∗∗∗SE =
c+ kg
2d
+
CSE + CAE
2
.
It shows that the supplier S2 has the maximum expected profits after the green investment, when
the purchase price of the main material m1 is P∗∗∗SE. 
Proposition 2 demonstrates that to motivate the suppliers to participate in green investment, the
manufacturer should allow the supplier to bid first, or allow the supplier to bargain. The supplier
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S1 will then tend to choose the equilibrium price P∗∗SE, where its expected profits are maximum. The
basic conditions for the manufacturer to accept the price of the supplier S1 are R1 > R5 and R1 > R9.
Otherwise, the manufacturer will turn to the supplier S2. The supplier S2 will then tend to choose
the equilibrium price P∗∗∗SE, where its expected profits are maximum. The basic condition for the
manufacturer to accept the price of the supplier S2 is R5 > R9. Otherwise, the manufacturer will
switch back to the supplier S1 and reach cooperation under the equilibrium price P∗∗SE. In a real
scenario with known data conditions, the final game equilibrium will be determined by one of the
three participants. In the case of a supplier’s first bid, if the manufacturer intends to cooperate with a
specific supplier, it needs to bargain with the supplier to make its expected benefits meet the critical
condition for cooperation.
4.3. Expected Benefit Analysis of the Supplier S3
Proposition 3. Although the supplier S3 is passively cooperative, an optimal supply price P∗YE of the auxiliary
material m2 still exits, where the expected profits of the supplier S3 are maximum in the GSC.
Proof. The expected profit of supplier S3 is,
piS3 = αR3 + (1 − α)[βR7 + (1 − β)R11]. (19)
Formula (19) is substituted by Formulas (3), (7) and (11), that is,
piS3 = QYE[(α+ β− αβ)(PYE − CYE − CBE) + (1 − α)(1 − β)(PY − CY − CB)]. (20)
Formula (20) is substituted by QY = e − f PY + kg, QYE = e − f PYE + kg, and the first derivative is
taken with respect to PYE, that is,
∂piS
∂PYE
= −2 f (α+ β− αβ)PYE − f (1 − α)(1 − β)(PY − CY − CB). (21)
We let the first derivative be zero, hence, when the supplier S3 maximizes the profits, the optimal
price of m2 is,
P∗YE =
e+ kg
2 f
− (1 − α)(1 − β)(PY − CY − CB)
2(α+ β− αβ) . (22)
It shows that the supplier S3 has the maximum expected profits after the green investment, when
the purchase price of the auxiliary material m2 is P∗YE. 
Proposition 3 indicates that regardless of which of the suppliers S1 or S2 chooses to cooperate
with the manufacturer M, the cooperation of the supplier S3 is required. According to the premise,
the complementary supplier S3 in this study is passively cooperative. However, if the benefits of the
supplier S3 is R3 > R7 and R3 > R11, or R3 > R11 and R7 > R11, the supplier S3 will tend to promote the
suppliers S1 and S2 to cooperate with the manufacturer. On the contrary, if R11 > R3 and R11 > R7, the
supplier S3 will tend to support the suppliers to refuse the green investment. The closer the equilibrium
purchase price of material m2 is to P∗YE, the more inclined S3 will support the implementation of
green investment.
4.4. The Implications of the Study
In this study, according to the actual situation of China’s textile and apparel industry, we consider
the research scenario where the government adopts a punishment-based governance strategy (i.e.,
production will be suspended until the environmental standards are met). In this context, the leader
of the supply chain (manufacturer) is trying to get suppliers involved in the greening of the supply
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chain. Our study provides a clear conceptual framework for the players to get involved in the
greening process.
In particular, we focus on the decision-making process of the manufacturer-led supply chain, and
define the decision-making scope in the sequential game. Proposition 1 obtain three possible game
equilibriums under the optimal conditions of the manufacturer’s expected benefits. In a single game
process, equilibrium can only be one of them. Hence, the manufacturer can encourage the suppliers
to participate in greening by partly bearing the green processing costs for the suppliers, or allow the
suppliers to take the lead in bidding, which might be more effective. Therefore, in Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3, we further discuss the game equilibrium and conditions in the case when suppliers take
the lead in bidding. In this case, the suppliers tend to get optimal benefits, and it is more conducive to
achieving greening cooperation.
5. Conclusions
The textile and apparel industry in China is at a critical stage of green upgrading. The fulfillment
of GSCM is a dynamic game process with complete information. Faced with the constraints imposed
by different strategic choices from different stakeholders, stakeholders need to make scientific and
rational decisions to address the main issues in the green process. Based on the reality of the textile
and apparel industry, this study develops a one-to-three sequential GSC game model, in which the
manufacturer is the leader. Through game analysis, the game equilibrium price and equilibrium
conditions of the GSC are defined, which provides the strategic space for all parties to participate in the
greening process and especially help the GSC leader to make managerial decision to promote greening.
Our game analysis makes the following specific contributions to the existing literature.
(1) We find that the equilibrium price of the GSC game is P∗SE and there are three possible
equilibrium states under this price. In a manufacturer-led sequential game, the manufacturer has
the right to bid first. The game equilibrium price P∗SE can be achieved under the condition of the
manufacturer’s first bid. At this price, the manufacturer has the maximum expected benefits, and one
of the three game equilibrium states, i.e., (R1, R2, R3, R4), (R5, R6, R7, R8), and (R9, R10, R11, R12), can be
reached. We obtain the strategic boundary of each equilibrium state. In a real scenario with known data
conditions, it is not difficult to deduce the final game equilibrium based on the results of our model.
(2) If the manufacturer intends to cooperate with a specific supplier at the price of P∗SE,
this equilibrium can be reached by adjusting the supplier’s cost conditions to meet its decision
boundaries. For example, in the first round of the game, to promote the supplier S1 to select the
cooperation strategy, the manufacturer can partly bear the processing cost (CD) of the green material
for the supplier, which can thus increase the supplier’s expected return to meet the critical condition
for cooperation (as described in Proposition 1).
(3) If the manufacturer intends to maximize the supplier’s willingness to cooperate, the supplier
may be allowed to take the lead in bidding. This situation usually occurs at the initial stage when the
manufacturer pushes the greening of the supply chain. We assume that the suppliers could take the
lead in bidding and obtain equilibrium prices P∗∗SE and P
∗∗∗
SE, as well as possible equilibrium states and
equilibrium conditions. This result provides useful guidance to effectively encourage suppliers to
participate in GSC.
(4) The influence of complementary suppliers on the decision-making of the main material
supplier cannot be ignored. The strategy of adjusting the purchase price can encourage complementary
suppliers to support greening. We consider the complementary supplier of auxiliary materials in this
study, analyze the optimal expected benefits of the complementary supplier, and obtain the optimal
supply price P∗YE, which helps for interpreting the behavior of such suppliers.
In summary, each stakeholder has the best behavior strategy in the GSC game. There must be
differences between these optimal strategies. Controlling the differences within the acceptable range
of all the players is the key to achieving the equilibrium of cooperative games. Quantifying these
differences and defining the scope of regulation acceptable to all parties is the focus of this study.
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The limitation of this study is that the scenarios and conditions considered are still not
comprehensive. First, we only consider the GSC game model under the complete information
and does not consider the case of incomplete information. Second, we assume the ex-factory price of
the product as the retail price and have not considered the impact of the retailer on the supply chain
pricing. In addition, this game is only carried out within the supply chain, without considering the
situation where external stakeholders, i.e. local governments, central government and consumers,
have not achieved a balanced interest. Third, if the government still adopts the environmental policy
of “who pollutes who governs” and shifts from “punishment-based” to “subsidy-based” in policy
measures, the government will subsidize SMEs directly and it will be unclear what types of the
game equilibrium of the GSC can be achieved. Fourth, future research needs to conduct numerical
analysis with actual manufacturer and supplier behaviors to clearly indicate the conditions of the
different types of equilibrium, which will test the model and help practitioners better understand
the strategies they should select in a real scenario. Finally, as different countries implement different
environment-protection policies and initiatives, it will be interesting to further evaluate how our model
might fit different policy settings in different countries.
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